Louisiana Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 2
Symposium Issue: The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1963-1964 Term
February 1965

Private Law: Mineral Rights
George W. Hardy III

Repository Citation
George W. Hardy III, Private Law: Mineral Rights, 25 La. L. Rev. (1965)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol25/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

fixed rule that a timely suit against one tortfeasor interrupts
prescription for other joint tortfeasors. 29 Thus, a timely suit
against a doctor preserved the effectiveness of the cause of
action; and, when it was later alleged that the hospital was a
joint tortfeasor, the hospital's insurer could not be released on
account of prescription even though the hospital might plead
the personal defense of charitable immunity.

MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL LEASES

Obligation To Protect Against Drainage
One of the most significant decisions rendered during the
1963-64 term was Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp, 1
in which plaintiff sought to recover damages for his lessee's
failure to prevent drainage of oil and gas from beneath plaintiff's premises. The essential allegations of plaintiff's petition
were that: plaintiff owned the land in question; defendant held
a mineral lease on the land in question granted by plaintiff;
defendant also held a lease on adjoining property; defendant
had drilled a well within eighty feet of plaintiff's property line;
approximately half of the oil drained from that well was drained
from beneath plaintiff's property; defendant had been previously placed in default; and, therefore, plaintiff was entitled
to damages equal to one-half of the one-eighth royalty from the
draining well. The trial judge sustained an exception of no
cause of action, and plaintiff appealed.
Despite the fact that the Third Circuit Court of Appeal sustained the judgment of the lower court, this decision is full of
meaning for both lessors and lessees in Louisiana. First, the
court rather clearly sustained defendant's exception of no cause
of action on the ground that plaintiff had not made proper
allegations. The opinion strongly asserts the existence of a
29. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2097, 3552 (1870).

*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 163 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 581, 165
So. 2d 481.
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cause of action for damages resulting from drainage of minerals
from beneath a leased tract in Louisiana, a matter which had
formerly been in considerable doubt. 2 The existence of such a
cause of action was considered to be in addition to the remedy
of cancellation which had been previously accepted as appropriate in situations of this kind. 3
The court indicated that the elements of a cause of action
for damages for drainage under the implied obligation to protect the leased premises include: the existence of substantial
drainage; proof with some degree of certainty of the quantity
of oil or gas that would have been produced from an offset well;
the value of lessor's share of such minerals; and proof that it
would have been economically feasible for the lessor to drill
an offset well. In adopting these elements as a possible cause
of action for damages for drainage in Louisana, the Third Circuit adhered to the majority rule.4 The measure of damages
under this rule is the amount of royalty which would be due if
the offset well had been drilled at the proper time and had
produced as proven by the lessor. The minority view accepts
as a proper measure of damages the lessor's royalty share on
drainage which he proves to have taken place from beneath his
property because of the lessee's failure to drill a profitable offset well at the proper time. 5
Two other features of this decision are of prime significance.
The first is presented by the fact that defendant lessee in the
Breaux case was also lessee of the adjoining tract on which the
draining well was drilled. Plaintiff sought to have the court
sustain the view that because defendant was lessee of both tracts
a greater right existed in plaintiff's favor to recover for the
drainage caused directly by his own lessee. 6 The court, how2. See, e.g. Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 245 F.2d 14 (5th Cir.
1957) ; McCoy v. State Line Oil & Gas Co., 175 La. 231, 143 So. 58 (1932).
3. Swope v. Holmes, 169 La. 17, 124 So. 131 (1929).
4. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163
,(1937) ; North American Petroleum Co. v. Knight, 321 P. 2d 964 (Okla. 1958) ;
Deep Rock Oil Co. v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 186 P. 2d 823 (1947) ; Junction Oil
& Gas Co. v. Pratt, 99 Okla. 14, 225 Pac. 717 (1924) ; Texas Pacific Coal and
Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Texas 418, 6 S.W. 2d 1031 (1928) ; Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7 S.W. 2d 872, 10 S.W. 2d 537 (Tex. Com. App. 1928) ; Sinclair Oil &
Gas Co. v. Bryan, 291 S.W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), error ref'd; 5 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, OI. & GAS LAW §§ 822, 825.2 (1964).
5. Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F.Supp. 332 (D. Wyo. 1963) ; Blair
v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921) ; Kleppaer v.
Lemon, 198 Pa. 581, 48 Atl. 483 (1901) ; 5 WILLIAMS & MEYMS, OIL & GAS
LAW

§ 825.2 (1964).

6. Several jurisdictions have postulated that the liability of the lessee is greater

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

ever, rejected this view, holding that the fact that defendant
Was lessee of both tracts made no difference whatsoever to plaintiff's substantive rights.
The realities of this situation are underscored by comparison
with the normal drainage situation. If A and B are lessees of
adjoining tracts and A causes drainage from beneath B's lease,
the natural competitive situation thus created gives B's lessor
at least reasonable assurance that B will be spurred to protect
his own interest as lessee, and therefore that of his lessor as
well. However, in the factual situation presented by the Breaux
case, this competitive urge is not present. No matter who participates in the production from a given well, and no matter
what lease tracts are drained by it, the lessee who holds the
leases on two adjoining tracts has to pay only a specified royalty
on production from any given well. Therefore, if two leases can
effectively be drained by a single well, common sense dictates
that the law should not present to a lessee an opportunity to
save on drilling costs without at least some sanction to assure
proper protection to both lessors.
The second additional feature of the Breaux decision is the
court's indication of the possibility of some protection for the
lessor whose property is drained by his own lessee. In dictum,
the opinion strongly intimates the existence of a cause of action
for a lessee's failure to protect leased premises from drainage7
by seeking the formation of an appropriate production unit.
The measure of damages in such cases would apparently be the
if it appears that his operations cause the drainage which is the source of the
lessor's complaint. Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F. Supp. 332 (D. Wyo.
1963) ; Geary v. Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Ill. 1940) ; Blair

v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921); Hartman
Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 Pac. 2d 1163 (1937) ; Hughes
v. Busseyville Oil & Gas Co., 180 Ky. 545, 203 S.W. 515 (1918) (dictum);
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Williams, 249 Ky. 242, 60 S.W. 2d 580
(1933)

(dictum) ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, 72 So. 2d 176,

74 So. 2d 731 (dissent)

(1954) ;Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687,

48 So. 2d 344 (1950) ; Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 173 S.E.

573 (1934) ; Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 839, 169 S.E. 529
(1933) (dictum) Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, 72 So. 2d 176,
S.E. 366 (1932) ; 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 824 (1964).

7. "It :is conceivable, although it is not necessary for determination to that
effect be made in this case, that the lessor would be entitled to recover damages
by alleging and proving that the lessee could have created a pooling unit, thus
enabling the landowner to participate in the production from the draining well,
but that he failed to do so. But, even on that ground the lessor must establish
the value of the minerals which he would have received if such a unit had been

timely formed."

Breaux v. Pan American

Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406,

415-16 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So. 2d 481.
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proven participation of the lessor in a properly formed unit,
certainly a lighter burden than that facing the lessor in an
ordinary drainage case. This dictum is a sound approach to
the problem of forcing a lessee to protect his lessor when drilling of an offset well might not pay out but drainage is nevertheless in significant amounts. This approach is also in keeping
with the prudent operator standard. If a lessor can prove that
a reasonably prudent operator, mindful of his obligations to
both lessors, would have sought the establishment of a production unit, whether by declaration, contractual agreement, or
conservation order, he should be entitled to recover the royalty
representing the calculated participation of his property if the
unit had been formed at the proper time.8 This concept is also
harmonious with the recognized duty of the lessee to deal fairly
with his lessor's interest and does not thwart the lessee's legitimate interest in minimizing drilling costs.
Utilization of the concept of a duty to unitize accomplishes
protection for the lessor which has been afforded in other jurisdictions only by perversion of the majority rule requiring proof
of substantial drainage, the profitability of an offset well, and
the royalty due if an offset well had been drilled at the appropriate time.9 Other jurisdictions, reacting instinctively to the
opportunity for unfair dealing presented by a lessee's conduct
in draining an adjoining tract which he also has under lease,
have sometimes dispensed with the requirement of proving that
an offset well would pay out. While this punitive alteration of
S8. In connection with and perhaps in opposition to, the suggestion of the
court that a lessee may be obligated to form a drilling and production unit, it
should be pointed out that under R.S. 30:6F (1950) "any interested person" may
provoke a conservation hearing. This phrase would include a lessor. Therefore,
a lessor has the right to provoke a conservation hearing to establish a unit which
will protect his interest. It might well be that the existence of this right could
be utilized to negate any obligation of the lessee to form a unit in protection of
the lease premises. However, it has been suggested by noted authorities, with
which the writer agrees, that because of the superior position of the lessee in
terms of technical capability and economic resources, the lessee should operate
under a duty to represent the lessor's interest in situations of this kind. This is
particularly true, as noted later in the body of this mansucript, when the lessee
causes the drainage and, because of his legitimate interest in minimizing drilling
costs, might be tempted to place his own self-interest before that of his lessor
See, e.g. Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitization, 2 OIA. L.
REv. 469 (1949).
9. Geary v. Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830 (E. D. Il. 1940) ; Bush
Oil Co. v. Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal. App. 2d 246, 158 P.2d 754 (1945) ;
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, 72 So. 2d 176, 74 So. 2d 731
(dissent) (1954); Adkins v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 113 W. Va.
490, 168 S.E. 366 (1932). For a full discussion of this problem see 5 WILLIAMS
& MiERY-S, OIL & GAS LAW § 824 (1964).
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substantive rights does offer a sanction which restricts lessee's
conduct in these circumstances, the approach conflicts somewhat
with the prudent operator rule. Despite the fact that an operator has adjoining tracts under lease, it seems unfair to require
of him a level of conduct beyond that of the prudent operator. 0
If a well would not be profitable, why should he be required to
pay damages for having failed to drill merely because he has
both tracts under lease? The suggestion of a duty to unitize,
on the other hand, does provide an outlet. Although a prudent
operator might not drill an uneconomic well, it is not at all unreasonable to expect that a prudent operator would unitize. The
measure of damages proposed by the Third Circuit opinion
would relieve the lessor of the need for proving profitability
of an offset well, measuring damages instead by a calculated
participation in the unit which should have been formed. Therefore, in those cases in which lessor cannot prove profitability
of an offset well, he will more often than not be protected if he
can prove actual drainage in an amount which would have warranted formation of a production unit.
One further matter concerning the suggested duty to unitize
should be discussed. What are the standards by which one
determines whether a prudent operator would form a unit?
Certainly, the normal technical standards concerning the drainage radius and production characteristics of a given well should
be applied. However, a lessee might be led, considering the
extremity of a lawsuit, to contend that even though a drilling
unit might be formed to include a part of the complaining
lessor's property, the reasonably prudent operator would not
have formed such a unit or sought its formation by compulsory
order as he was the lessee of both tracts and needed no such
order. Indeed, there is some basis for this contention in the
Louisiana jurisprudence. However, the concept of the lessee's
duty of fair dealing should overcome any such argument. One
of the criteria by which the conduct of a reasonably prudent
operator should be judged is that such an operator would comply
with his obligation to deal fairly with the interests of all persons from whom he has leases and to protect their interests as
well as his own. This expectation is particularly appropriate in
a situation in which the operator has a primary interest in
minimizing his own expenses, a consideration which might lead
him to give his own interest a paramount position as compared
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:with that of the lessor whose land he is draining if unitization

'were not available.
It is to be noted that the Breaux case does not treat the
problem of default in drainage cases. A strong argument can
be made that default should not be required, except possibly by
express provisions of the lease, even if the drainage is caused
by one other than the lessee of the drained tract. 1' However,
there is a substantial basis for dispensing with the default requirement if the operator is lessee of both tracts. The act of
draining two leases by means of one well is not merely a passive
failure to comply with an obligation to protect the drained lease,
it is conduct clearly inconsistent with that obligation if it occurs
in the face of actual or constructive knowledge of the drainage. 2
Thus, the lessee's action should properly be viewed as an active
10. It might be here noted that Judge Tate suggested in dissenting from
Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964), writs denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So. 2d 481, that certain of the elements of
the cause of action for damages as stated by the majority should be made matters
of defense to be asserted and proved by the lessee. These include: whether drainage has actually occurred or could have been prevented by offset drilling or conservation remedies. Further, it has been suggested in 5 WILLIAM & MEYERS, OIL
& GAS LAW § 824.2 (1964), that because of the possibility of unfair dealing in
the situation where the lessee owns both the drained and the draining lease, the
burden of going forward with evidence and the burden of persuasion as to profitability of the offset well, should rest on the lessee. Thus, the plaintiff's case
would consist of (1) proof of substantial drainage; (2) proof that lessee's operations were the cause of the drainage; and (3) the amount of the damages.
11. The damages caused by drainage should properly be viewed as compensatory rather than moratory damages for mere delay in performance. It has been
urged that no formal default should be required as a prerequisite to an action for
compensatory damages. See Smith, The Cloudy Concept of Default, 12 ANN.
INST. ON MINERAL LAW, to be published in 1965. The remainder of the discussion
in the text of this article, however, is based upon the assumption that courts
will continue to apply the active-passive breach dichotomy, requiring a formal
putting in default as a prerequisite to recovery of damages for passive breach of
contract and dispensing with such requirement if the breach can be characterized
as active.
An additional argument that no default should be required as a prerequisite
to recovery of damages for failure to protect leased premises against drainage
may be based upon LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1933 (1) (1870), under which damages
are due from the time of the breach if the obligation in question is one which
may be performed only within a certain time or under certain circumstances
which no longer exist. Clearly one may not protect against drainage which has
already occurred. Therefore, it would seem logical to hold that no default would
be necessary when recovery for past drainage is being sought. As to future
drainage, the lessee might protect himself in several ways in response to a suit
for damages: he would be able to tender performance of his obligation to protect
against drainage; he might also defend on the ground that further efforts at
protection would be fruitless as future drainage would be in insignificant
amounts.
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1931 (1870) : "A contract may be violated, either
actively by doing something inconsistent with the obligation it has proposed or
passively by not doing what was covenanted to be done, or not doing it at th(
time, or in the manner stipulated or implied from the nature of the contract."
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breach of his lease contract. The writer holds this view despite
the contrary opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for
13
the Fifth Circuit.
Categorization of the lessee's conduct as an active breach of
contract might accomplish two laudable ends. First, it would
dispense with the requirement of default as a means of fixing
the time from which damages should be computed.. Damages
would be due from the time the lessee knew or reasonably should
have known that the offending well was draining his lessor's
property. The second benefit lies in freeing the lessor from the
necessity of keeping track of a large volume of technical information which he may not have the resources to obtain or
decipher and which, quite often, may be unavailable to him. If
damages are due only from the time of default, the burden is
obviously placed upon all lessors to keep close watch on the
reservoir characteristics and production behavior of wells on
adjoining property under lease to his own lessee, a burden which
seems a bit unfair.
The only further question regarding default is the impact
which an express default clause in the lease would have on the
type of factual situation under consideration. There are two
lines of reasoning which give substantial support to the argumenht that when the operator has a lease on two adjoining tracts
and knowingly continues to drain one of the properties without
either unitization or offset operations, even an express default
requirement should be inoperative. First, if characterization
of this conduct as an active breach of contract is correct, the
theory Which underlies our Civil Code rules concerning damages indicates that the lessee needs no notice of his transgression;14 for he has done something inconsistent with his contractual obligations, not merely failed to give timely performance.:: Thus, an express default requirement could be read as
applying only to a mere failure to perform and not to active
breaches of contract.
The second source of substantiating logic is in the jurisprudence. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that when a
ehSs e is aware of an obligation, :specifically an obligation 1to
* 13. Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 245 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1957),

hoted,

i8 LA. L. REV. 354 (1958).

.

14. For a discussion of this matter see generally Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 354
(19~8J
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pay royalties, and knowingly and willfully refuses 'to meet it,
-neither a judicial ascertainment clause nor a retained acreage
clause would be operative. 15 There is at least an analogy to the
drainage situation under discussion. If a lessee has actual or
constructive knowledge that he is draining his adjoining lease
under such circumstances that the reasonably prudent operator
would either commence offset operations or form a productioi
unit, it could be said that his failure to take appropriate steps
for, protection of the adjoining lease while in possession of
knowledge of the impact of his conduct represents. a 'willful
failure to perform an obligation. Although there might be no
suggestion of actual fraud or bad faith in many cases, this
analogy does not seem inappropriate under the circumstances.
Some comment should be made concerning the problems of
pleading presented by the Breaux decision. The lessor contemplating an action for damages should be impressed with the
fact that this opinion, if accepted throughout 'Louisiana's apipellate system, requires a very strict compliance with its suggested standards of pleading and proof. The necessary elements
for statement of a cause of action for damages for drainage
include: the existence of substantial drainage; the quantity of
oil or gas that would have been produced from an offset well;
the value of lessor's royalty share of such minerals; and proof
that it would have been economically feasible for the lessee to
drill an offset well -that
is, the well would not merely have
met operating costs if put into production, but would have "paid
out" the investment costs. 16 If the ground for the action is that
15. Bollinger v. Texas Co., 232 La. 637, 95 So. 2d 132 (1957) ; Melancon v.
Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956). In 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS ,OIL &
GAS LAW § 824.2 (1964), it is suggested that the mere fact that a lesseeis causing drainage should not dispense with an express requirement of -notice of demand
prior to commencement of an action for damages. This view may be appropriate:
in other jurisdictions where damages are due from the time when the lessee knew
or should have known of the drainage. However, the concept of default, if utilized in Louisiana as it has been in many instances in the past, imports the consequence that damages become due only from the time of the default. Therefore,
if a lessor were limited to damages for drainage occurring only after the "default,
the right to recover damages might be worth very little. Therefore, it is submitted
that Professors Williams and Meyers have made a suggestion which is both, erroneous and inappropriate as applied to Louisiana law.
. 16. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163
(1937) ; Renner v. Monsant'o Chemical Co., 187 Kan. 158, 354 P.2d 326 (1960) ;
North American Petroleum Co. v. Knight, 321 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1958) ; Texas Consolidated Oils v. Vann, 208 Okla. 673, 258 P.2d 679 (1953) ; Hoffman v. Shel: Oil
Co., 205 Okla. 79, 235 P.2d 696 (1951) ; Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, 184
Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427 (1938) .Chapman v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 297 S.W.2d
%--" ..885 (Tex. Civ. App.i956), error ref'd n.r.e.
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a lessee has failed to establish a drilling unit, the basic elements
which would have to be pleaded and proved would include: the
existence of substantial drainage; the drainage radius of the
well, and thus the amount of the lessor's property which should
have been included in a production unit; the amount of drainage; the existence of and failure to utilize means for unitization;
and the calculated participation of lessor's property in the minerals already drained. Additionally, if default presents a problem, as it did not in the Breaux case, the lessor would be well
advised in either instance to plead default or at least a point
in time from which it could be said that the lessee actually knew
or reasonably should have known of the drainage.
It may be observed that the possibility created by the Breaux
case of including a duty to unitize within the prudent operator
standard seems to strengthen the overlay of ownership concepts
added to Louisiana's basic non-ownership property regime, a
trend flowing from enforcement of our conservation legislation.
If this is true, it does not necessitate alarm or concern, and
Louisiana's courts need not balk at implementation of this concept because of ownership connotations. It should be frankly
recognized that conservation legislation and technological advance have in combination caused substantial changes in the
rights of parties whose property overlies oil and gas reservoirs.
The jurisprudence should not reflect an arid affinity for conceptualism in this regard.
Obligation of Further Development
The decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in
Saulters v. Sklar17 sustains the existence of the implied obligation to further develop leased premises but properly applies the
prudent operator standard to deny partial cancellation of a
lease. Plaintiff had purchased a tract of land forming part of
a larger area previously subjected to a mineral lease by plaintiff's vendor. A producing well existed on a portion of the lease
not owned by plaintiff, unitized by conservation order. Plaintiff's property was included in two units established by a conservation order which were undeveloped at the time of suit.
Although defendant lessee had a portion of the acreage included
in the undeveloped units under lease, he was not lessee of the
17. 158 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writs denied, 245 La. 638, 160
So. 2d 227.
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area falling within the drill sites designated by the Commissioner of Conservation. Plaintiff made a demand for release of
the property or alternatively for reasonable development. Defendant replied that he preferred not to release plaintiff's
acreage as it might be utilized for a deep unit. Five months
later, plaintiff received a good faith offer of a lease on his
property and within a week thereafter filed suit seeking cancellation. The Second Circuit reversed the lower court and
rejected plaintiff's demand, finding that there was no evidence
that defendant's decision not to attempt any further development in the shallow sands on plaintiff's land was not a reasonable and justifiable decision on the part of the lessees. There
was no testimony, either geological or otherwise, that anyone
other than plaintiff considered it reasonable or prudent to conduct any further developments. The court seems to have been
somewhat influenced by the fact that a well commenced on one
of the units including a part of plaintiff's property after commencement of the litigation was abandoned as a dry hole. Certainly this sort of thing, though perhaps not of the highest
logical relevance, is a matter of pragmatic concern.
Several aspects of this decision are significant. Obviously,
plaintiff was relying heavily on the decision rendered previously
by the Second Circuit in Nunley v. Shell Oil Co.' In that instance, however, defendant lessee had taken the position that
no prudent operator would develop the acreage in question as
all of its geology disclosed that the acreage would be unproductive. Plaintiff in the Nunley case introduced testimony of a
bank officer with practical experience in leasing who indicated
that he would take a lease on the property in question with a
firm drilling commitment. In the Nunley case the Second Circuit felt that a lessee should not be allowed to sit on acreage,
refusing to further explore the lease on the ground that such
development would be fruitless, when plaintiff lessor could
secure a lease from an experienced person and obtain early
development of his property. In the Saulters case, however,
the lessee took no such position. His reply to plaintiff's demand
for development was, to say the least, highly equivocal, but at
least it did not take the position that any efforts to develop
would be fruitless.
18. 76 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
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The Saulters decision seems proper and possibly represents

one further small step in what appears to have been'at least 'a
partial retreat from the Nunley decision.1 9 However, it would
be a mistake to assume that this opinion represents a reversal
of Nunley. The best interpretation is probably that plaintiff
suffered from a failure of proof. In the light of the circumstances of the particular case, the mere presence of a good faith
offer, to lease was not considered sufficient to show that defendant had not acted as a reasonable and prudent operator.'
Another facet of this case warranting comment: is,that. the
acreage under lease to defendant was not within the drilling
area of the two undeveloped units. This fact should not by itself be relevant to a determination of whether defendant behaved
as a prudent operator. The prudent operator 'standard should;
under modern circumstances, include an obligation to dowhatever is necessary to effect a unitization or to make operating
agreements permitting development of established units in which
''Tsseehas acreage not falling within the drilling 'area. Of
course, if the lessee has made such efforts to unitize or to effec
an operating agreement as would have been made by. a prudent
operator under the circumstances, plaintiff should not prevail
in any demand for cancellation. On the other hand, the way
should be open for a lessor to show a lack of due diligence in
this regard.
19. Romero v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 93 F. Supp. 117 (E.D_ La. 1950).;!
modified, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952); Middleton v. California Co., 237 La:
1039, 112 So. 2d 704 (1959).' In the Romero case lessor had produced' n perator who testified that he would be willing to take a lease on tile acreage- in quest
tion with an obligation to drill. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit gave the lessee sixty days in which to satisfy the court that it liltended
to drill on the premises. If within that sixty days the operator who.testified :for
lessor furnished satisfactory assurances that lie would drill, the court stated that
the lease would be cancelled with tile exception of retained acreage unless defend:
ant lessee satisfied the court within ten days after the operator's assurances that
it would further develop the lease. This type of decree has the effect of forcing
the bona fide offeror of a lease to satisfy the court of the seriousness of his intent

thus avoiding the temptation to an operator to testify as a favor to:the lessor
without any serious intent to take a lease if the existing lease. is cancelled. In
the Middleton case the record disclosed that the lease in question 'w;as of some'
4,600 acres. Lessee had operated a number of years and completed forty produc 7
ing wells. There was ample evidence'of a continuous and well co-ordinated drilling and exploration program on the lease. The court refused cancellation on the
ground that immediate development of all parts of the lease woud be an-impqs.
sibility. In view of the continuous drilling program, the testimony of a responsible
operator willing to undertake a drilling obligation on the. untested portions of the.
lease was not deemed decisive.
.
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Drilling Operations Maintaining Lease

In Caldwell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.20 defendant lessee
was engaged in drilling operations on the date the primary term
of its lease expired. Operations were conducted beyond that
date, and during their continuance a conservation order was
issued including a portion of the leased premises in a production
unit. The plaintiff contended the lease had expired, arguing
that the clause permitting continuance of drilling operations
beyond expiration of the primary term maintained the lease in
force only insofar as it granted the right to continue such drilling operations or to engage in further operations within sixty
days of abandonment of a dry hole. Although some authority
exists in other states under which plaintiff's position could have
been sustained, the court took what appears to be the better
view, holding that when the lease was maintained beyond its
primary term by drilling operations it was maintained in force
and effect for all purposes. Therefore, the unitization had the
effect of accomplishing production at a time when the lease was
still in force. After cessation of the drilling operations the
lease was properly held to be maintained by unit production.
Timely Payment of Royalties
Although other issues were involved, the decision in Fawvor
v. United States Oil Co. of Louisiana, Inc.21 stands out because
it adds another piece to the puzzle concerning timely payment
of royalty which began with Melancon v. Texas Co. 22 and evolved
through Bailey v. Meadows 23 and Pierce v. Atlantic Refining
Co. 24 The Bailey and Pierce decisions articulated the concept
that "failure to pay production royalties under an oil and gas
lease for any appreciable length of time, without justification,
amounts to an active breach of such lease which entitles the
lessor :to a cancellation thereof without the necessity of placing
the lessee in formal default. ' 25 The emergence of this general
rule has been ably discussed in a previously published student
20. 155 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
21. 162 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 575, 165
So. 2d 479.
.22. 230 La. ,593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956).
23. 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
24. 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
25. Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So. 2d 19, 29 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So. 2d 501, 508 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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comment. 26 It was there noted that the Fawvor decision sup-

ports the conclusion that the appellate courts will examine the
facts and circumstances of each case involving alleged unjustifiable delay in commencing payment of production royalties
rather than stating general rules based upon lapse of time. It27
may be pointed out that in Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co.,

the delay involved was approximately six months. In the Fawvor
case, however, the delay was eight months; yet cancellation was
denied.
The Fawvor record disclosed that the delay was occasioned
partially by obtaining surveys and title examinations of the
area included within the unit. This delay initially consumed
approximately three of the eight months in question. At that
time lessors took the position that the lease had terminated
automatically for failure to pay delay rentals. This position is,
of course, inconsistent with any demand for payment of royalties, and any attempt at payment would have been no more
than a formality. However, approximately eight months after
establishment of the production unit defendant lessee did begin
issuance of royalty checks which were received and retained by
lessors each month.
Under the circumstances the decision that the delay of eight
months in commencing payment of royalties was not unjustified
is clearly correct. The salient factual element in this case is the
lessors' assumption of the position that the lease had terminated
automatically for failure to pay delay rentals. The importance
of this fact was underscored in a concurring opinion by Judge
Tate, who emphasized that although a substantial portion of
the eight-month delay was excusable because of the necessity
for performing all of the administrative tasks necessary to compute royalty participation in the unit, the delay might not have
been excusable but for the lessors' contention that the lease
had terminated for failure to pay delay rentals. This analysis
appears to be the correct one, for if the lessors had not informed
lessee of their position that the lease had terminated, the facts
of the case would have been very nearly indistinguishable from
28
those in Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co.

The Fawvor decision is a welcome amelioration or elabora26. Comment, 24 LA. L. REV. 618 (1964).
27. 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
28. Ibid.
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tion of theBailey-Pierce concept. Though the writer recognizes
the basic elements of merit in the attitude which inspired the
emergence of this concept, its utterance has nevertheless sparked
a great revival of the game of "lease snatching" by lessors in
Louisiana. Despite the fact that some sanction should be applied when a lessee willfully, arbitrarily, or negligently fails
to. commence payment of production royalties for an unreasonably extended period of time, the remedy of cancellation is certainly harsh in view of the high level of investment by lessees
in achieving production. It is additionally harsh in these cases
because the principle as evolved permits complete cancellation.2 9
it is, perhaps, the prospect of this remedy which has spurred
lessors to hover like carrion crows over the administration of
leases when production is first established, hungrily awaiting
the fatal error. Perhaps the Fawvor decision will dim the general enthusiasm for this practice.
Pooling Clauses
Certainly the decision in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
Jones'° is one of the most significant in recent years. Although
this case has been ably noted in an earlier edition of this
Review,3 1 its importance requires that it at least be mentioned.
3 2
On the second trip to the top of the Louisiana court system,
the definitive opinion was written by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeal. Writs were denied by the Supreme Court.3 3 Without
considering the conflict within the court over the question
whether the particular unit in question was a "contractual" or
a "declared" unit, one can draw certain conclusions concerning
the law governing unitization and the life of different types of
units in Louisiana. First, in the case of a declared unit, with
which the court found it was dealing in the Jones case, the normal pooling clause in use today grants the lessee authority to
29. See the decrees in Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962) and Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
30. 157 So. 2d 110 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), writs denied, 245 La. 568, 159
So. 2d 284 (1964).
31. Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 935 (1964).
32. The case had previously been decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal,
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones, 125 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960).
However, the case was remanded on procedural grounds by the Louisiana Supreme
Court, Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Jones, 241 La. 661, 130 So. 2d 408 (1961).
The original opinion by the Third Circuit is essential to an understanding of the
final opinion, which essentially confirms the original.
33. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones, 245 La. 568, 159 So. 2d 284 (1964).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

declare a unit essentially for purposes of conservation. Upon
issuance of a conservation order defining the drainage area of
a unit well and establishing a unit with different geographical
outlines from that of a previously declared unit, the declared
unit is terminated or resolved as it no longer has any substantial
conservation purpose.
The court seems to be on firm ground in adopting the attitude
that "parties should not be presumed to have agreed to share
their interests on the old declared unit unless they show a
specific and positive intention to freeze the old unit. '3 4 This
decision does nothing to destroy the flexibility of contractual
devices as parties could agree to permit unitization in such
manner as to "freeze" participation. However, in the absence
of an express intent to do so, it is proper to refuse to find any
such implied intent, particularly when the lease defines the
reasons for which units may be declared and limits the pooling
power to conservation purposes.
The second conclusion is that if the court had been dealing
with what it termed a "contractual unit" -that is, one formed
by an agreement to which all parties in interest are signatory the interests of the participating parties might have been
frozen. 35 While this is probably a correct interpretation of the
average unitization agreement, it is dangerous to place labels
on units in the abstract. Just as it is possible that a pooling
clause might permit a lessee to freeze a given lessor's interest
in a declared unit, it would also be possible for parties to a contractual unit to agree that later formation of a conservation
unit would dissolve the contractually created unit. However,
the court seems to adopt the view that in the case of a contractual unit, the situation of the parties and the fact of entry
into the agreement by all interested parties warrant the inference of an implied intent to freeze participating interests. Although the writer has some reservation about implication of
intent to freeze participating interests generally, this is not an
unsound approach in most instances.
Thus, it seems that there is an emerging tendency to require
an express intent to freeze an interest in a declared unit under
34. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones, 125 So. 2d 640, 646 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1960).
35. In addition to the principal case, see Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish
School Board, 145 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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the standard pooling clause and to infer such an implied intent
in the typical contractual unit. Accepting the caveat that one
should be careful in attaching labels to agreements which are
still flexible and subject to alteration by contracting parties,
these rules offer a satisfactory guide to persons concerned with
unitization problems.
One further observation should be made concerning the Jones
case. There is language in the majority opinion suggesting that
the declared unit was "superseded" by the conservation unit
because of an inherent conflict between the two.30 This is a very
fuzzy thought. Situations of this kind do not present problems
of conflict between the effectiveness of the conservation laws
and private agreements. The purposes for which the conservation unit were formed can be fully achieved without the necessity of dissolving an existing voluntary unit, which could be
viewed simply as a sharing arrangement between the interested
parties. The truth of this statement is borne out by the Third
Circuit's own reasoning regarding "contractual" units. The
court's view is that a contractual unit would not be dissolved
by a subsequently formed conservation unit and that parties
would continue to share in production according to the terms
of their contractual agreement.37 If a contractual unit can exist
without burden or conflict with the conservation scheme, there
is no reason whatsoever why a declared unit cannot continue to
exist if the agreements involved are susceptible of an interpretation that the parties intended such a result.
This problem of conflict between conservation orders and
property and contractual rights is an increasingly complex one
and bears discussion in a more extended but separate article. 8
It is sufficient here to state that the Louisiana courts show an
increasing tendency to find conflicts between private agreements or property rights and the conservation scheme when no
such conflict actually exists. There is a strong suspicion that
this attitude cloaks a public policy favoring some divisive effect
which fosters a partial return of mineral rights to the landowner.
36 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones, 125 So. 2d 640, 648 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1960).
37. See note 34 supra.
38. For a discussion of another aspect of this subject see the discussion under
topic "Mineral Royalty" infra.
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Subleases
In Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Gulf Coast Drilling & Exploration Co.,8 9 plaintiff sublessor sued its sublessee for damages
for failure to maintain an oil and gas lease in force in accordance with their sublease agreement. The original lease taken
by plaintiff and sublet in part to defendant contained a "Pugh
clause"; as part of the acreage covered by the lease had been
included in a conservation unit, rentals were due on the outside
acreage. It appeared that plaintiff had advised defendant of
the method to be utilized in computing the rentals on the outside
acreage and had for two years made such payments for defendant's account. The amount of acreage from the lease included
in the conservation unit was reduced by reformation of the unit,
thus increasing the rental paymerts due. The third rental payment was made by plaintiff but without correction for reduction
of the unit. The original lessor immediately advised plaintiff
of the error, and apparently employees of plaintiff received
notice of the lessor's objection on the day on which rental was
due. Defendant answered plaintiff's petition and reconvened,
contending that the lapse of the lease resulted from actions for
which plaintiff was solely responsible. The district court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment and also rejected
defendant's reconventional demand.
It was obvious to the court that plaintiff sublessor, having
retained an interest in the lease, having undertaken to pay the
delay rentals on the subleased tracts, and having had knowledge
of the conservation order reducing the lease acreage included in
the unit, was in no position to fix responsibility for the underpayment on defendant. Similarly the defendant had no right
to recover damages from plaintiff. The decision seems to rest
upon the notion that although defendant was contractually burdened with responsibility for rental payments on the subleased
acreage, plaintiff's participation in making the rental payment
and computing the amounts to be paid constituted a pattern of
conduct between the parties in administering the contract which
made the obligation of making rental payments a joint responsibility of sublessor and sublessee. Thus, participation in the
making of payments and knowledge of the facts which would
have permitted proper payment by both parties prohibited, each
from fixing legal responsibility on the other.
39. 154 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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MINERAL ROYALTY

The decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Montie
'v. Sabine Royalty Co. 40 further elaborates the decision rendered
in Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse4 1 concerning the
effect of production from a voluntary unit on prescription of a
mineral royalty. The importance of this case warrants its discussion jointly with Frey v. Miller,42 which, strictly speaking,
is not due for discussion until next year's symposium.
In the Montie case, plaintiff landowners sought cancellation
of a mineral royalty owned by defendant on a 368 acre tract of
land insofar as the royalty affected acreage not included in a
producing unit. The unit in question was established by declaration under a lease granted by the landowners and included only
9.624 of the 368 acres subject to the royalty. There was never
any pooling agreement or other contract regarding the unit
signed by both the royalty owner and the landowner. Therefore,
there was no basis for finding any intent to divide the royalty.
* However, the landowners contended that as the instrument
creating the mineral royalty in question had specifically authorized the execution of leases on the property by landowners
and further as the lease contained a "Pugh clause," this should
have the effect of dividing the royalty interest. If this contention had been sustained, the interest would have been preserved
only in the acreage included within the unit. The Third Circuit
quite correctly refused to give the Pugh clause in the lease executed by the landowners any such effect. To do so would have
given the landowner unilateral power to divide the mineral
royalty by the execution of a contractual agreement. Certainly
no such power should be found unless expressly stated in a conveyance.
The Montie case is most interesting in juxtaposition with
Frey v. Miller,43 in which the effect of a conservation unit on
a royalty interest was considered. The factual situations were
similar in that in Frey the unit included only a part of the tract
subject to the royalty interest. Therefore, the only basic dis40. 161 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 84, 163
So. 2d 359.
41. 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575 (1960).
42. 165 So. 2d 43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 844, 167
So. 2d 669.
43. Ibid.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

tinction between the two cases is that one unit was established
by declaration and the other by compulsory order of the Commissioner of Conservation. On rehearing, the Third Circuit reversed its original opinion and held that the conservation order
had a divisive effect on the royalty interest, which was, therefore, preserved by production from the unit well only on acreage
included therein. The court felt itself bound by the decisions
of the Supreme Court regarding mineral servitudes in Childs v.
Washington44 and Jumonville Pipe & Machinery v. FederalLand
45

Bank.

While the Third Circuit's action in following the Supreme
Court jurisprudence with regard to servitudes may be justifiable on the ground of the Supreme Court precedents and also
on the ground that in dictum in Crown Central Petroleum Corp.
v. Barousse46 the Supreme Court intimated that the Childs and
Jumonville decisions would be applicable to mineral royalties,
the Frey and Montie decisions point up the fallacious reasoning
which affects this entire area of the Louisiana jurisprudence.
In both of these cases there is no contractual agreement from
which any intent to divide the royalty interest could have been
implied. The only distinction is the difference in methods by
which the units were established. This fact leads one to consider whether this distinction may not be arbitrary, and in that
regard whether it might not even afford some basis for contending that there is a denial of equal protection of the law in the
differing treatment of the two situations.
This symposium is not an appropriate forum for an extended discussion of the jurisprudence in this area. It is noteworthy,
however, that a principal legalistic basis for the distinction between these two cases is that in one there is a supposed "conflict" between conservation laws and private property rights or
agreements. 47 Therefore, it is asserted, the latter must yield.
This is an unreal view. There is no conflict whatsoever between
private property rights in this instance and the conservation.
order. The ends of conservation are served regardless whether
44. 229 La. 869, 87 So. 2d 111 (1956).
45. 230 La. 41, 87 So. 2d 721 (1956).
46. 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575 (1960).
47. This fallacious assumption was observed and discussed by Chief Justice.
Fournet in dissenting from the denial of writs in Frey v. Miller, 246 La.,844,
167 So.2d 669 (1964).
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the interruption extends only to the acreage included in the unit
or to all the acreage subject to the servitude or mineral royalty.
This unrealistic rationalization of the cases involving units
established by conservation order actually seems to be no more
than a cloak for a policy attitude on the part of the courts. There
seems to be a strong feeling that, if a servitude owner or royalty
owner is to receive the benefit of an interruption of prescription
resulting from operations off the servitude or royalty premises,
the effect of such use should be limited. The validity of this policy can be argued freely and with ample support on either side.
However, one cannot help observing that there is no basis for
making the arbitrary distinction which appears from the Montie
and Frey decisions. If the Supreme Court determines that its
policy is to limit the effect of an off-premises use, this policy
should be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. The whole
idea that conservation orders have some automatic divisive effects on servitudes or royalties in these situations seems questionable: in neither instance is there any proper basis for inferring an intent that conservation orders should have this effect
when the parties to a conveyance have been completely silent on
the matter. The writer proposes to subject this problem to a
more extended discussion at a later date. It was hoped that the
Supreme Court would have considered these two cases as they
bring the problem of the impact of conservation orders on servitude and royalty rights sharply into focus. It is suggested that
either a more straightforward approach to the public policy
problem should be adopted, or the notion that conservation orders have automatic divisive effects should be abandoned.
PUBLIC LANDS

Lewis v. State4 8 is a satisfying breath of fresh air after the
recent decisions tending to favor circumvention of the constitutional prohibition against alienation of mineral rights by the
State of Louisiana. 49 Plaintiff's ancestors in title held under a
1943 patent issued in satisfaction of a lieu warrant of 1942. The
1942 lieu warrant was issued in substitution of a warrant granted in 1862 after discovery that the state had no title to the land
described in the original warrant. The 1943 patent contains no
express reservation of mineral rights. Plaintiff contended that
.48.. 244 La. 1039, 156 So. 2d 431 (1963).
49. Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So. 2d 373 (1959) ; King v. Board of
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article IV, section 2, of the Louisiana Constitution" ° requiring
reservation of mineral rights in property sold by the state was
inapplicable because prior rights had accrued under the 1862
patent. Plaintiff also contended that the state could not make
a collateral attack on the patent and pleaded the six-year prescription under R.S. 9:5661 (Act 62 of 1912). 51 The Supreme
Court, however, rejected plaintiff's demands.
Distinguishing the case at bar from earlier decisions in which
applications for lieu warrants were made prior to 1921, the court
held that article IV, section 2, of the Constitution was applicable
as no action of any kind was taken by the holders of the defective
patent until 1942. Thus, the conveyance took place after 1921.
The court found no exclusionary language in the 1921 constitutional provision which would permit the interpretation demand,ed by plaintiff. It also rejected the argument that the state was
making a collateral attack on the patent, observing that the
titles of both plaintiff and the state were at issue.
Further, the six-year prescription under R.S. 9:5661 was
held inapplicable. It was stated that the prescriptive statute
"must yield to the Constitution of 1921, which embodies the
clearly stated public policy that mineral rights in all land sold
by the state must be reserved. The state cannot lose by prescription that which it cannot constitutionally alienate."
OTHER CASES

A number of other cases were decided during the past term.
However, discussion of these is omitted for any one of several
reasons: some have been noted in this issue or in previous issues ;52 others are of no great significance in terms of their conCommissioners for Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 148 So. 2d 138 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962), writs denied, 244 La. 118, 150 So. 2d 585 (1963), noted 24 LA. L.
REV. 416 (1964).
50. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2: "In all cases the mineral rights on any and all
property sold by the State shall be reserved, except where the owner or other
person having the right to redeem may buy or redeem property sold or adjudicated
to the State for taxes."
51. LA. R.S. 9:5661 (1950) : "Actions, including those by the State of Louisiana, to annul any patent issued by the State, duly signed by the Governor and
the Register of the state land office and of record in the State Land Office, are
prescribed by six years, reckoning from the day of the issuance of the patent."
52. Little v. Haik, 246 La. 121, 163 So. 2d 558 (1964) is cited and Hayes v.
Muller, 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191 (1963) is the principal case in the note appearing in 25 LA. L. REV. 277 (1964). Landry v. Flaitz, 245 La. 223, 157 So. 2d
892 (1963), was discussed in last year's symposium, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1962-63 Terma - Mineral Rights, 24 LA. L. REV. 215,
221-23 (1964).
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tribution to the emergence of Louisiana mineral law ;53 and still
others, though involving mineral contracts, do not turn on points
4
of mineral law.

INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
Policies of insurance continued as a fruitful source of litiga.
tion in the appellate courts during the 1963-64 term. The Insurance Code, with a view to encouraging prompt payment of
claims, contains a number of provisions permitting the recovery
of penalties and attorneys' fees for delay in payment. These
provisions tend to minimize litigation. On the other hand, the
well-settled and justifiable rule that the insurance contract, if
ambiguous, is to be construed against the insurer and liberally
in favor of the insured has a tendency to encourage litigation.
On the whole, the decisions rendered by the courts demonstrate
a creditable restraint in the application of both of these rules.
Most of the cases in this area turned on factual issues not justifying discussion, yet a fair number were sufficiently significant
to bear noting.
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY

The family combination automobile policy continues to give
rise to the greatest amount of litigation. A particularly wellwritten opinion in this area is the case of Smith v. Insurance
Co. of the State of Pennsylvania.1 It contains an exhaustive review of the cases dealing with the troublesome problem of coverage for the benefit of permittees. The court held a regulation
of the Department of Public Safety forbidding the use of state53. Scott v. -Hunt Oil Co., 160 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writs
denied, 245 La. 950, 162 So. 2d 8; Scott v. Ware, 160 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1964) ; State ew rel. Bordelon v. Justice, 160 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964), writs denied, 245 La. 1084, 162 So. 2d 574; Menefee v. Pipes, 159 So. 2d
439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 245 La. 798, 161 So. 2d 276; Armour
v. Smith, 158 So. 2d 446 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writs granted, 245 La. 637,
160 So. 2d 227 (1964) ; Birdsong-Gabriel Oil Co. v. McCain, 154 So. 2d 216 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1963).
54. Martin Timber Co. v. Roy, 244 La. 1050, 156 So. 2d 435 (1963) ; Johnson
v. Lemons, 157 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 161 So. 2d 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).

